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Abstract 
Over the past decade, numerous disciplines have taken on speculation as a method 
for research, a tool for thought, or a topic of study. In so doing, sociology, politics, 
design, geography and other disciplines have all helped to readdress the nature and 
potential of speculation, as a way of thinking, but also as a way to bridge the gap 
between theory and practice, something that often plagues philosophy. Despite the 
variety of perspectives in this range of disciplines, they often draw upon a common 
philosophical canon. This paper explores current discussions of speculation in the 
context of speculative philosophy, as well as work in new materialisms from Karen 
Barad, and Jane Bennett, to address some potential exchanges between new 
materialisms and speculation. The paper concludes with a brief description of a 
symposium held in 2018 that explored these themes across disciplines. It advocates 
further exchanges between speculative and new materialist approaches, as one way 
of figuring the place of matter in theory. 
Introduction: The Speculative Aspiration 
In 1867, the first issue of Journal of Speculative Philosophy was published. In a brief 
editorial called ‘The Speculative’, William Torrey Harris outlines his vision for the role 
of speculation in philosophy, and intellectual life more generally. He writes that to 
think speculatively is to ‘think, in the highest sense’ to ‘transcend all natural limits’ 
(1867, p. i). Harris includes in his list of natural limits things such as ‘national 
peculiarities…distinctions in race, habits, and modes of living’ (ibid.). In practice, this 
meant for Harris and his cohort of authors, that disciplinary boundaries could and 
should be disassembled, and the barrier between intellectual life and political action 
dissolved. Harris’s particular ambitions for speculation did not fully materialise. As 
Stuhr points out in his review of an edited collection of the JSP, ‘intellectuals 
retreated into research universities throughout the twentieth century, [and] the 
philosophers of the Bildung movement seemed amateurish precisely because of 
their social and political involvement (2003, p. 239).  
While the ambitions Harris laid out may not have come to fruition, the spirit of those 
ambitions is something we can still relate to, at a time when academic research 
across the disciplinary spectrum is making moves to show its wider social impact. 
This paper explores how the spirit of speculation as Harris conceived it might be 
rendered today, through more recent speculative approaches in research, and new 
materialisms, drawing on their common philosophical inheritances. Transcending 
‘natural limits’ might seem like an overly abstract or even naïve idea, but I will show 
in the remainder of this paper how contemporary iterations of both speculation and 
new materialisms share something of this ambition. In particular, I am interested in 
the how mutual exchanges between speculative approaches and new materialisms 
can help in shaping frameworks for more-than-human domains. This can be 
rendered as the problem of moving beyond what Quentin Meillassoux has called 
correlationism, the idea that there is no way to render an understanding of the 
world ‘independently of our subjective link to it’ (2012, p. 72). This is something that 
speculation and new materialisms share, to think beyond the subjective, beyond the 
merely human, while avoiding both naïve empiricism and extreme rationalism.  
Of particular importance here, is that speculation and new materialisms share a 
concern with showing how a certain conception of existence (ontology) has political 
and ethical resonances. I defend this idea, with some modifications, against Paul 
Rekret’s recent critique (2016), by appealing to post-representational new 
materialisms such as Karen Barad’s (2003). It is via this entanglement of existence, 
matter, politics and ethics that speculation and new materialisms both make a move 
that challenges correlationism by de-centering the human. How can this decentering 
be reconciled with the singular absolutising vision of speculative philosophy that 
runs through Harris’s editorial? It is necessarily complicated by our own 
contemporary world, one which Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby call a world of 
‘multiple realities’ (2013, p. 159), and the considerations this necessitates about 
futures, both human and more-than-human. New materialisms have faced 
challenges to their calls for putting matter in equal standing with subjectivity, and 
the resulting de-centring of the human. The philosophical inheritances, shared 
between speculation and new materialisms – particularly Whitehead’s philosophy – 
can help tend to some of the problems highlighted by critiques such as Rekret’s. To 
establish this discussion, I summarise some of the prevailing conceptions of 
speculation in philosophy, including Whitehead’s. 
Speculation in Theory 
There are three distinct but interrelated ways one can describe speculation in 
philosophy, which all inform the more recent discussions of speculation in other 
disciplines.  
Cartesian speculation is based on a kind of ‘introspection’. This form of speculation is 
concerned primarily with deducing the primary of human reason in securing the 
structure of knowledge, and as such is abstracted from the “merely empirical” 
entirely. Cartesian speculation has no use in experience, but is rather a process of 
pure thinking. 
Kantian speculation adapts and expands this Cartesian introspection, and while it is 
still ultimately self-referential, Kant does include the caveat that speculation also 
accepts the necessary existence of things-in-themselves, a world beyond and 
independent of our experience. Vitally, there is no contradiction in Kant’s view for 
conceiving of this world beyond our experience or have its own kinds of productive 
powers, purposes and even agency. It is simply the case that none of this can be 
proven within the limits of human knowledge. Speculation, or what Kant calls the 
speculative employment of pure reason, cannot by itself generate any knowledge. 
Rather, speculation is a vehicle for establishing the boundaries of what can be 
known. Hence, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant claims that ‘all possible 
speculative knowledge of reason is limited to mere objects of experience’ (Bxxvi).  
Whiteheadian speculation is a further expansion of the still ultimately subjective 
form it takes in Kant. Speculation, more than a mode of reason, is an entire 
philosophical project, in which the endeavour is to ‘frame a coherent, logical, 
necessary system of general ideas in which every element of our experience can be 
interpreted (1978, p. 1). Such a system must be more than merely subjective, as it 
seeks the whole out of which subject and object relations are constituted. 
Whitehead contends that ‘there is an essence to the universe that forbids 
relationships beyond itself’, and that ‘Speculative Philosophy seeks that essence’ 
(ibid., p. 2). The key factor in Whiteheads case, however, is that while Speculative 
Philosophy seeks an ultimate ‘coherence’ between all the disparate elements of our 
knowledge and experience, the goal is not guaranteed at the outset. Speculation is 
like the ‘flight of an aeroplane’ through the ‘thin air of imaginative generalisation’ 
(ibid.). It ascends from the secure ground of the empirical, but also requires a large 
amount of abstraction, of thinking above and beyond this ground. This is what gives 
speculative philosophy its value for Whitehead; that it embrace both the rigour with 
which the plane is constructed, and the perilous thin air it must navigate. 
All three of these notions of speculation refer to grand metaphysical projects beyond 
the scope of this paper to elucidate. However, they do highlight some of the 
underlying concerns that recent discussions of speculation inherit. 
Whitehead’s aerial metaphors speak to how speculation must embrace an uncertain 
path, must strive for new knowledge without guarantees, and that, rather than 
requiring discipline from some other faculty of thought, to contain this uncertainty, 
speculation must itself be the vehicle both of flight and discovery. Speculation must 
be the expansion and limit of knowledge. 
The Call for Speculation as Practice 
The recent collection Speculative Research (Wilkie et al., 2017) is an exemplary set of 
discussions on the conceptual and methodological issues with speculation being 
used in research about futures. The starting point of the collection is to rescue 
speculation from the negative associations with which it has historically been 
burdened beyond the philosophical context. Speculation is associated with 
prediction and forecasting, particularly in terms of risk analysis. Here, speculation is 
a volatile element that needs to be managed with proper predictive tools and 
methods. Speculation is also associated with the global financial system, as a form of 
investing with potentially high gains, but an attached risk of substantial losses.  
While these two forms of speculation are certainly relevant when talking about 
futures, the kinds of speculation discussed in Speculative Research refer to more 
philosophical renderings of the term. It is these philosophical renderings that 
connect back to projects such as Harris’s Speculative Philosophy.  
Rosalyn Diprose claims that speculative thinking and speculative research show that 
‘speculation is ontological and political’ (in Wilkie et al., 2017, p. 42). In Diprose’s 
account, this is taken as motive for dwelling upon and exploring further the potential 
of speculative thinking for shaping academic practices. For Diprose, this continuity 
between ontology and politics derives from the Whiteheadian claim that speculative 
thinking is anchored to experience, that it is ultimately verified by experience. By 
extension, political agency is tied directly to the affective, corporeal dimensions of 
individual experience (ibid., p. 45). Diprose suggests that the kind of speculation 
rooted in Whitehead’s philosophy is ‘crucial to political agency, democratic 
pluralism, and innovation’, because it opens up possibilities for experience that are 
futural and unpredictable (ibid., p. 41). The political implications of speculation for 
Diprose, then, materialize via their opposition to tendencies in conservative 
democratic forms of government, to try and curtail speculation by holding a 
monopoly on prediction. By allowing for a speculative ontology sees thinking as 
intimately bound up with experience of the material world, the totalizing tendency 
of governments (to control experience of the material world via a particular way of 
thinking) can be combatted. 
Diprose stresses the importance of ‘teaching otherness’ in fostering a speculative 
political ontology (ibid., p. 45), what she calls ‘inspiration’. Speculative thinking and 
its creative potentialities cannot be nurtured when kept in isolation from other 
perspectives, other voices, and a willingness to affect and be affected by these. The 
challenge here, is to keep speculative thinking balanced in this relationship between 
one and others, to show how it is more than merely thinking in the air, giving, as 
Michael Halewood warns, ‘anyone the chance to think whatever she or he wants’ (in 
Wilkie et al., 2017, p. 53). Diprose’s account of speculation, as continuity between 
ontology and politics, operates within this challenge. In addition, her endorsement 
of inspiration illuminates a dynamic relationship between Harris’s and Whitehead’s 
forms of speculation. Surely, ‘teaching otherness’ is a route toward thinking beyond 
national, racial and social differences, as Harris desires. It is a route, however, which 
relies not upon eliminating these differences, but by embracing their affects, via the 
Whiteheadian move, anchoring thinking in experience. This dynamic is also 
illuminated by new materialisms. I will now introduce some of the key ideas in new 
materialisms, before putting them in dialogue with speculation. 
Matter matters! 
Throughout this paper, new materialisms is written in plural, following Coole and 
Frost’s book of the same name. For Coole and Frost, a defining feature of new 
materialist approaches is that they are comprised out of multiple disciplines, 
histories, and interpretations (2010, p. 4). Materialism, much like speculation, is not 
singular; it means something different depending upon which school of materialism 
to which one subscribes. As such, I offer a conclusive definition neither of new 
materialism, nor of speculation. Another important reason for this, is that both 
perspectives, as I interpret them, resist singular, straightforward definitions. Instead, 
I work through, and, as Haraway advises, stay with both speculation and new 
materialisms. 
SoTherefore, given that new materialisms resist definition, a gesture is still needed 
toward the ways that this paper, and new materialist thinkers, understand the 
term(s). For Dolphijn and van der Tuin, ‘revolutionary and radical ideas [in academia] 
are actualized through an engagement with scholars and scholarly traditions of the 
canonized past’ (2012, p. 13). They continue, ‘contemporary generations read, or 
more often reread older texts, resulting in “new” readings that do not fit the 
dominant reception of these texts’ (ibid.). Dolphijn and van der Tuin go on to call this 
a ‘new metaphysics’, by which they mean a re-assessment of old ideas, and thinking 
as a whole, according to perspectives not accessible to those who are the subject of 
this reassessment (ibid.).  
While avoiding straightforward definitions, it can be said that new materialist 
approaches are concerned with challenging the dominance of representationalism, 
brought about by the impact of the linguistic turn. This linguistic turn, and its rise 
through movements like post-structuralism and deconstruction, interrogate a 
perceived language/reality dualism, which has roots in older and more general 
dualisms entrenched in the European tradition since Descartes, such as 
mind/matter, subject/object, human/world. For a new materialist like Karen Barad, 
the issue here is over how these dualisms are not objective truths, but are 
performed, in what she calls the agential cut (2003, p. 815). 
Barad’s form of new materialism subverts the assumption that ‘we have a direct 
access to cultural representations and their content that we lack toward the things 
represented’ (ibid., p. 801). This is what Bruining (2016) calls one of the founding 
gestures of new materialism, a general dissatisfaction with the reliance upon 
language to give us the truth about a world, which is otherwise unresponsive, i.e. 
palpable only to human cultural concerns. For Barad, representationalism has 
become so entrenched in Western intellectual traditions that it is treated as 
common sense, as the only way of interacting with the world (ibid., p. 806). One 
alternative that Barad proposes is performativity. While performativity has an 
established history in social theory and especially feminist theory, Barad seeks to 
extend the performative beyond the social to the material.  
Barad’s work shares some concerns with other new materialist figures such as Jane 
Bennett, for demonstrating the need to look beyond the human as a location of 
meaning, value and agency. Bennett’s iteration of new materialism, which she calls 
vital materiality, aims to show that material things ‘have a positive, productive of 
their own’ (2010, p. 1), and highlight the ‘active role of nonhuman materials in public 
life’ (ibid. p. 2).   
Critiques, Commonalities and Concerns 
Why is this relevant to speculation? Aside from Whitehead being a shared influence, 
speculative approaches such as Diprose’s also seek to challenge the same dualisms 
with which Barad takes issue. Similar to Barad, Diprose associates subject/object and 
mind/body distinctions with forms of regulatory power that dampen creative 
thinking (2017, p. 45). The implication here is that attending more sincerely to 
materiality challenges ‘instrumental thinking’ and overly abstract notions of agency, 
in favour of more heterogeneous and diverse intellectual practices. Is it this kind of 
implication with which Rekret critiques new materialisms, Rekret claiming that they 
commit the mistake of ‘collapsing ontology and ethics’ (2016, p. 226). Rekret argues 
that the resulting weakness of new materialist thought is a ‘deployment of ethics as 
a means of asserting the ontological primacy of matter’ (ibid.). Rekret’s main point of 
contention is his claim that new materialist perspectives assert ‘a continuity 
between ontology and ethics’ (ibid. p. 227). This seems very close to Diprose’s 
assertion that ‘speculation is both ontological and political’ (2017, p. 42). There is a 
sense in both these claims that a particular ontological framework yields either a 
politics or an ethics. For the remainder of this paper I will dwell upon these two 
claims and how they relate to each other. 
New materialisms have faced challenges to their call for incorporating matter into 
meaning. Paul Rekret poses one such challenge, by critiquing what he characterizes 
as the collapsed distinction between ontology and ethics is more complex, namely, 
that a certain view of matter yields ethical demands with respect to that matter. 
Central to Rekret’s critique is his claim that new materialisms, Bennett’s among 
them, is that they rely on a binary choice between either ‘attunement to or 
resentment to materiality’ (2016, p. 227). This is perhaps where the aspiration for 
entangling matter and ethics causes problems. But they are not insoluble problems. 
It need not be the case that caring for the ethical charge of a particular ontology 
requires a binary choice between either caring about matter or not. Rather, new 
materialisms, in dialogue with speculation can be employed as a call to move 
toward, dwell upon, consider, the ethical dimensions that emerge from considering 
matter as playing a part in intellectual endeavours. 
This call can be rendered as a ‘struggle’, as Whatmore calls it, for ethics to ‘smuggle 
some semblance of the messy heterogeneity of being-in-the-world’ (2002) back into 
accounts of that world. To put it simply, if ethical descriptions strive to matter, they 
ought to incorporate some of that matter into their descriptions. Similarly, is 
speculation hopes to confront the messiness of multiple futures, then seeing 
speculation as a material practice may aid in such a pursuit. 
A mutually informative dialogue between speculation and new materialisms is useful 
because in each of their guiding assumptions is contained a search for what is on the 
other side. In other words, the practice of speculation can be new materialist, and 
the theory of new materialism can be speculative. It is possible to reclaim new 
materialisms from the charge that they reduce to either a binary choice between 
attunement or resentment to materiality, by reformulating this binary as dynamic.  
Rekret’s critique constructs the claims of new materialisms according to the same 
representationalist scheme that both Barad and Bennett challenge. Attending to the 
role of matter in public life, a la Bennett, or conceiving an ontology that is always-
already bound up with ethical resonances, a la Barad, does not necessitate closing 
off New Materialisms wholly from other modes of discourse. One can see Barad’s 
onto-ethico-epistemology as a call to action without seeing it as a non-negotiable 
statement of fact. The anti-representionalist tendencies in new materialisms may 
seem like a get-out clause, but when reconstructed in the context of the spirit of 
speculation with which I began, viable ways emerge of both attuning to matter and 
engaging with speculative thinking. A series of methods proposed by John Law 
(2003), help illuminate the common concerns of speculation and new materialisms: 
Unpredictability, becoming, mess, spontaneity, in-articulability, responsibility 
Staying with Speculation Symposium 
Speculation has become a buzzword of sorts in academia over the past few years. 
Because of this, and due to my numerous encounters with authors who posit 
speculation as some positivist, miracle tool for messy issues – smart cities, the 
Anthropocene, post-truth politics, urban futures – I was moved to dwell on 
speculation, as tool, as method, as subject, as troublesome. The resulting symposium 
Staying with Speculation (Halton Mill, Lancashire, June 2018) generated some 
interesting responses to the issue of speculation, and how it relates to futures. 
It was these kinds of themes that informed Staying with Speculation symposium. The 
content of the symposium was largely exploratory, sharing encounters and 
conceptions of speculation through co-creative activities (see figure one). Commented [Reviewer1]: We ask that figures are 
included in comments only if they are absolutely essential to 
expand on the text. In this case we suggest the figure is not 
essential and we request it be removed.  
If an ethics is not straightforwardly necessitated out of a particular ontology, as 
Rekret criticises new materialisms for assuming, then what is the significance of 
attending to the matter of materiality, and in what ways is this a speculative 
enterprise? Some questions that this work has raised, and which warrant further 
investigation: 
 Can or should there be links forged between certain ways of thinking 
(speculation), certain attitudes towards matter and materiality (new 
materialisms) and political agendas?  
 If so, how should these links be negotiated? 
 In what ways can speculation be construed as a material practice, or, practice 
of mattering? 
New materialisms can help to realise and make real the material, more-than-human 
worlds with which speculation implicitly deals, to forge a two way street between 
thinking and matter. If such a process is a political one, it is because attending to the 
practices of speculation and their matters, requires attending to our entanglements 
with material worlds, both human and more-than-human. It requires attending to 
our responsibilities and response-abilities, the abilities we have to respond to matter 
and the abilities matter has to respond to us. 
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Figure One: Maps make districts make abstracts 
This figure shows the results of a mapping exercise in which themes and objects 
associated with researcher’s speculative approaches are placed in concordant and 
discordant relations.  
